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 SELF AND SELF-REGULATION:  
RESOLVING THE SRO IDENTITY CRISIS 
Onnig H. Dombalagian* 
Market-based self-regulatory organizations (SROs) are in the throes of 
an identity crisis. Once the physical hub of trading activity, securities 
exchanges have become primary nodes in a larger web of electronic 
securities trading. Their mantel of regulatory authority, a traditional source 
of reputational integrity, is now characterized as a yoke around their necks, 
stifling competitive initiatives while embarrassing them in successive 
marketplace scandals. Once the voice of the securities industry, SROs are 
now accused of advocating no interest more keenly than their own survival. 
Faced with these challenges, it is not surprising that many exchanges are 
looking for ways to shed their self-regulatory responsibilities and join the 
ranks of their erstwhile members as for-profit competitors. 
And yet, the apparent crisis of faith in exchange-based regulation has 
called into question the broader idea of self regulation. New regulatory 
models—such as the one employed by Congress in creating the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)—are being devised to 
fund and oversee regulation of the securities industry, without being 
accountable to it. SROs are taking pains to play down the ties of their 
industry personnel with (or distance them altogether from) the industry they 
regulate. Industry leaders and associations have even entertained the 
possibility of dismantling the current self-regulatory system entirely in 
favor of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation.1 
With all its shortcomings, however, self-regulation is inherently a 
sound—and perhaps somewhat underutilized—means of regulating 
securities market conduct. Even if exchange-based regulation has failed, 
policymakers should think twice before writing self-regulation out of the 
Exchange Act. Despite the extraordinary public attention devoted to stock 
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 1. See SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, REINVENTING SELF-REGULATION: WHITE PAPER FOR THE SIA’S 
AD HOC COMMITTEE ON REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS OF DEMUTUALIZATION (Jan. 5, 2000), 
available at http://www.sia.com/market_structure/html/sia whitepaperfinal.htm [hereinafter SIA 
White Paper]. Among other goals, the SIA (which has since merged with The Bond Market 
Association to form the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association) called for a unitary 
SRO, with industry representation in regulatory oversight and a transparent fee system, which 
would serve as the sole source of SRO rulemaking and interpretations, examinations, and 
investigations. See Rachel McTague, In Push for Single SRO for Brokers, SIA Enunciates Its 
Goals, Principles, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 162 (Jan. 30, 2006). 
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exchanges and the NASD, there are many SROs that provide the critical 
infrastructure needed to ensure fair and efficient markets while sparing the 
SEC and the public the cost of securities oversight. SROs are also best 
positioned to debate and promulgate the ethical norms that govern the 
industry, as long as such responsibilities are confined to those spheres of 
activity where they work best. The presence of multiple SROs with over-
lapping memberships, if properly coordinated by the SEC to ensure 
standardization, can further help ensure fair representation of all industry 
groups in regulatory decisionmaking and promote better rulemaking. 
I. SELF-AWARENESS 
What does “self-regulation” mean? On a purely etymological level, it 
suggests a process by which a person, organization, or group of persons 
establishes and enforces rules to govern its, or their own, conduct without 
the need for regular outside intervention. This definition, of course, might 
well pick up any public company, financial institution, or other business 
entity that is required to establish internal controls for regulatory purposes. 
In the securities and commodities industries, the term is rooted in the 
historic private compacts among exchange members. The basic structure of 
self-regulation assumes (and the Exchange Act now requires)2 that broker-
dealers would be members of at least one SRO, that members would be 
fairly represented in the governance of SROs, and that SROs would 
undertake to enforce compliance with their rules by their members.3 
The Exchange Act nevertheless has some difficulty articulating what 
should qualify as a self-regulatory organization, since the term itself was 
defined after the fact to refer to national securities exchanges, registered 
securities associations such as the NASD, registered clearing agencies, and 
other specialty bodies.4 The source of congressional intent lies in the term 
“member,” which includes, in addition to natural persons trading on the 
floor of an exchange and their associated brokerage firms, any “broker or 
dealer which agrees to be regulated” by an exchange or registered securities 
association and with respect to whom the exchange or association 
“undertakes to enforce compliance with the provisions of [the Act], the 
rules and regulations thereunder, and its own rules.”5 
Though the two are often analogized, self-regulation must be 
differentiated from private ordering in the sense that self-regulatory 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (2000).  
 3. As discussed below, SROs have the additional responsibility of enforcing compliance by 
their members and controlling persons with the provisions of the Exchange Act and the rules and 
regulations thereunder. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(1), 78o-3(b)(2) (2000). 
 4. Id. § 78c(a)(26). The only statutory self-regulatory organization recognized in section 
3(a)(26) of the Exchange Act is the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB); however, 
other bodies with self-regulatory powers and duties, such as the Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation (SIPC), have been created by the Exchange Act. See id. § 78ccc(a)(1). 
 5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881.  
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organizations operate under Commission oversight, receive limited 
immunity from the antitrust laws,6 and must observe specific formalities for 
the adoption of new rules, policies, and procedures.7 Private ordering 
remains an important component of the regulatory system for securities 
markets, particularly in those areas where securities regulators lack the 
jurisdiction to regulate their members’ conduct.8 Today, numerous 
securities trade associations promulgate “uniform rules” or best practices 
for their members, maintain standard agreements for interbroker 
transactions, collect statistical information about their members for the 
benefit of the public, and perform other market ordering functions.9 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See, e.g., Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); Gordon v. N.Y. Stock 
Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); United States v. NASD, 422 U.S. 694 (1975); In re Stock Exchs. 
Options Trading Antitrust Litig., 317 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003). Cf. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down provisions of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act establishing a National Recovery Administration to oversee voluntary compliance 
with industry codes of competition). 
  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Credit Suisse First Boston v. Billing, 426 
F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 762 (2006), cert. vacated and granted, 2007 
U.S. LEXIS 3020 (March 19, 2007), on the question: 
[w]hether, in a private damages action under the antitrust laws . . . , the standard for 
implying antitrust immunity is the potential for conflict with the securities laws or . . . a 
specific expression of congressional intent to immunize such conduct and a showing 
that the SEC has power to compel the specific practices at issue. 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Credit Suisse First Boston v. Billing, 2006 WL 616006, at *1 
(2006) (No. 05-1157). The registration requirements for self-regulatory organizations and the 
statutory delimitation of the scope of their self-regulatory activity may thus remain a critical 
prerequisite to antitrust immunity. 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b), (c) (2000) (establishing procedures for the filing of “any proposed rule 
or any proposed change in, addition to, or deletion from the rules of [each] self-regulatory 
organization”); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4(c), (d) (2007) (requiring the filing, as a “proposed 
rule change,” of any “stated policy, practice, or interpretation” of, or “interpretation of an existing 
rule” by, a self-regulatory organization). 
 8. See, e.g., Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), 
http://www.sifma.org/about (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) (“[SIFMA] represent[s] more than 650 
member firms of all sizes, in all financial markets in the U.S. and around the world.”); 
Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II, http://www.crmpolicygroup.org (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2007) (describing itself as a group of senior officials from major financial institutions 
with the “primary purpose of . . . examin[ing] what additional steps should be taken by the private 
sector to promote the efficiency, effectiveness and stability of the global financial system”); 
Financial Market Lawyers Group (FMLG), http://www.newyorkfed.org/fmlg/ (last visited Mar. 
21, 2007) (describing itself as a group sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
comprised of lawyers who “advise[ ] on legal issues relevant to over-the-counter foreign exchange 
and other financial markets” and “support foreign exchange and other financial markets trading in 
leading worldwide financial institutions”). 
 9. See, e.g., SIFMA Standard Agreements, http://www.bondmarkets.com/stdagrmnts.asp (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2007) (noting the guidelines, procedures and documentation for, inter alia, 
offerings of securities by government-sponsored enterprises, trading practices with respect to 
repurchase agreements, delivery guidelines and buy-in procedures for mortgage-backed securities, 
and standard documentation and supporting legal opinions for global master repurchase 
agreements and master securities loan agreements); SIFMA Bond Markets & Prices, 
http://www.investinginbonds.com/MarketAtAglance.asp (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) (providing 
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Such organizations have, however, historically lacked the wherewithal 
to monitor for compliance, as well as the legal ability or economic incentive 
to discipline non-compliant members: The inability of exchanges and 
industry associations to police securities markets effectively prior to the 
Crash of 1929—despite their anti-regulatory lobbying efforts—aptly illus-
trates how private ordering can break down in securities markets.10 As such, 
industry norms are most likely enforced, if at all, through provisions in 
bilateral agreements between members. A systemic failure of such enforce-
ment mechanisms, however rare, is almost certain to invite Commission 
intervention absent the buffering effect of self-regulatory compliance and 
disciplinary mechanisms. 
The most basic self-regulatory function might be deemed mutual 
regulation, or the regulation of transactions among members through rules 
that “foster cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in 
regulating, clearing, settling, processing information with respect to, and 
facilitating transactions in securities.”11 This standardization function sets 
the rules governing the interaction of public orders, the execution of 
transactions, the comparison of trading logs by members, the settlement of 
such transactions, and the delivery of securities.12 Rules of mutual 
                                                                                                                 
data on municipal, government and corporate bonds; and mortgage and other asset-backed 
securities transactions); FMLG FXC Master Agreements, http://www.newyorkfed.org/fmlg/ 
documentation/master.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) (standard documentation that sets forth 
common legal terms for foreign exchange and currency option transactions, “including payments 
and close-out netting provisions”); International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) 
Bookstore/Publications, http://www.isdadocs.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) (providing 
documentation for over-the-counter derivative transactions and accompanying protocols and user 
guides). 
 10. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 31–36 
(1970) (describing the gap between the “managerial and moral responsibility for the national 
securities industry” the Investment Bankers Association had undertaken as a result of its anti-
regulatory lobbying efforts and its “incommensurate . . . organizational development and . . . fund 
of economic intelligence,” its “serious information lag” with respect to the operation of the larger 
marketplace, and its reluctance “to coerce either members or clients” to provide full disclosure); 
id. at 36–41 (describing stock exchanges’ “reluctan[ce] to enforce standards of disclosure upon 
listed companies” and their inability and unwillingness to verify the accuracy of statements made 
in listing applications). 
 11. Order Granting Approval of a Proposed Rule Change Amending Rule 180 to Require 
Member Organizations to Use the Automated Liability Notification System of a Registered 
Clearing Agency, Exchange Act Release No. 55,132, 72 Fed. Reg. 3896 (Jan. 26, 2007). 
 12. The centrality of this function is evidenced by the fact that it is coordinated by a single 
SRO, the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, pursuant to section 17A of the Exchange Act 
regarding a national system for clearance and settlement of securities transactions. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78q-1 (Supp. II 2002); RULES, BY-LAWS AND ORGANIZATION CERTIFICATE OF THE 
DEPOSITORY TRUST COMPANY, http://www.dtcc.com/CustomerFocus/dtc_rules.pdf. While 
exchanges and the NASD retain basic rules for the post-trade clearance and settlement of 
transactions, Congress has expressed a preference for uniformity across all markets in this area. 
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-229, at 102 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 333 (“To assure 
the development of a modern, nationwide system for the safe and efficient handling of securities 
transactions in a manner which best serves the financial community and the investing public, the 
Senate bill and the House amendment directed the [Securities and Exchange] Commission to 
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regulation might also be deemed to include minimum capital requirements 
for broker-dealers who clear securities transactions, since members who 
agree to abide by uniform rules of execution and settlement must rely on 
each other’s creditworthiness. The discipline or expulsion of noncompliant 
members is a clear restraint against trade, but one which is sanctioned as 
long as it is conducted under the supervision of the Commission. 
A second, equally important self-regulatory function might be deemed 
reciprocal regulation, or the development of standards that govern relations 
between members and their public customers. While members may not be 
financially interested in the terms of their peers’ transactions with the 
public, such norms of competition not only enhance the protection of 
investors by prohibiting predatory conduct, but also increase the 
profitability of being a market intermediary by credibly signaling the higher 
standard of care to which SRO members adhere.13 Thus, members will 
commit to observe collectively-developed standards regarding business 
conduct and practices on the condition that other members do so as well.14 
Because such rules may also carry an anti-competitive tinge, even when 
they exist for otherwise valid regulatory reasons, some supervision by 
regulators or antitrust enforcement authorities is appropriate. 
Some aspects of self-regulation may also be characterized as purely 
partitive, in the sense that they are driven by the desire to balance the 
interests of one class of members (e.g., the managerial class, the specialist 
class, the “bulge bracket” firms) against the often conflicting interests of 
                                                                                                                 
facilitate the establishment of the system and centralized in the Commission the authority and 
responsibility to regulate, coordinate and direct the operations of all persons involved in the 
securities handling process.”); S. Rep. No. 94-75, at 5 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
179, 184 (“[The Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs] Committee is persuaded that the 
present uncoordinated state of affairs with respect to securities processing should not be allowed 
to continue. When securities firms must deal with a dozen or more different clearing and 
depository systems in their daily securities operations, the result necessarily is excessive cost and 
poorer service to investors. A national clearance and settlement system is clearly needed.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities 
Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563, 581–82 (2005). The requirement that all 
broker-dealers be members of an SRO, of course, correspondingly deters SROs from raising their 
standards to a level that would make entry into continued participation in the broker-dealer 
industry unreasonably prohibitive. 
 14. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003) (arguing that the “logic of reciprocity” may provide greater incentives to 
overcome collective-action problems than conspicuous rewards and punishments). In the context 
of broker-dealer regulation, such business conduct and practices comprise, among other things, 
rules regarding customer solicitation (e.g., advertising, sales practices, suitability, and know-your-
customer diligence), personnel (e.g., qualifications, examinations, and supervision), fees (e.g., 
commissions, markup schedules, and terms of credit), and disclosures (e.g., confirmations and 
periodic statements). See, e.g., NASD Rule 2000 Series (CCH Jan. 2005). 
  The model of reciprocity is reflected, when considering the international or supranational 
arenas, in agreements among states or regulatory bodies that require a market’s or investment 
firm’s home country regulator to apply and enforce minimum standards of regulation as a 
condition of permitting such market or firm to provide services in the territory of another member 
state or regulatory body. See infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
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another. Rules regarding the affirmative and negative obligations of 
exchange specialists, as well as the obligations of market makers, were 
adopted for the benefit of public brokers. Because specialists profit from 
trading against customer order flow even as they facilitate the execution of 
public orders, a regulatory balance must be struck to ensure that the 
symbiotic relationship does not become parasitic.15 Similarly, SRO rules 
regarding the form and minimum content of clearing arrangements ensure 
that the relationship between clearing and correspondent brokers is clearly 
defined with respect to all material terms.16 One might view recent rules 
governing the automation of exchange trading systems as serving 
institutional interests (i.e., earnings from execution fees) at the expense of 
member firms with competing electronic trading systems or market making 
operations. 
Finally, some aspects of self-regulation are not really “self”-regulatory 
at all, but merely serve a gatekeeping function.17 For example, SROs adopt 
minimum quantitative standards for listed issues to create a reasonable 
expectation that such securities will trade in a liquid secondary market. 
Qualitative listing standards regarding corporate governance and investor 
protection also serve an important reputational goal for the SRO and its 
membership, as does the surveillance of markets for manipulative or 
deceptive conduct by insiders or other individuals improperly trading on the 
basis of material nonpublic information in an issuer’s securities.18 Such 
rulemaking is difficult to describe as “self-regulation” to the extent that 
issuers are not afforded significant representation in exchange governance 
structures.19 
                                                                                                                 
 15. SEC, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, pt. 2, at 64–67, 142–57, 162–71 (1963); see 
generally George T. Simon & Kathryn M. Trkla, The Regulation of Specialists and Implications 
for the Future, 61 BUS. LAW. 217 (2005) (exploring the role of the specialist and how federal law 
regulates them). 
 16. See, e.g., NYSE Rule 382 (requiring that agreements between NYSE members or member 
organizations that relate to the carrying of customer accounts specifically identify and allocate 
certain enumerated functions and responsibilities and be submitted to and approved by the 
Exchange); NASD Rule 3230 (requiring clearing or carrying agreements entered into by members 
to specify the respective functions and responsibilities of each party with respect to certain 
enumerated matters). 
 17. Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 
2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53–54 (1986) (defining “gatekeeper liability”). 
 18. Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU 
L. REV. 325, 329–30 (2001) (describing exchange listing standards developed before the 
enactment of the Exchange Act); John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top: The Impact of 
Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1772 (2002) (noting that non-U.S. firms may choose to cross-list their 
securities in the United States, in part, based on the reputational value of a U.S. listing and the 
“higher likelihood of legal enforcement, the signal of profitable investment opportunities, the 
more credible promise of improved disclosure, contractual protections negotiated on entry into the 
U.S. market, [and] the enhanced analyst coverage” associated therewith). 
 19. See infra text accompanying notes 46–56. 
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Conferring regulatory authority on SROs for promulgating and 
enforcing such standards may, to a degree, be justified on the ground that it 
builds upon their commercial interests. As the burdens of federal regulation 
grow and listing fees and trading revenues are placed in jeopardy by over-
regulation, the exchanges’ commercial interest in acting as gatekeeper for 
the securities industry becomes far more attenuated. For example, surveil-
lance of manipulative and deceptive conduct by members and their 
associated persons and other persons trading through the facilities of the 
exchange—while originally intended to curtail certain trading practices by 
exchange members and their customers in listed securities20—now fairly 
encompasses any manipulative or deceptive conduct under Rule 10b-5 and 
requires coordinated enforcement effort by all exchanges and the NASD.21 
The taxonomy above illustrates the fundamental benefits and 
disadvantages of self-regulation. When the power of self-interest is 
harnessed to achieve common benefits, self-regulation (with the 
Commission’s well-oiled shotgun behind the door) can be a very effective 
and affordable means of regulating the securities markets. Troubles abound, 
however, when SROs are asked to take on regulatory obligations that are at 
best tangential, and at worst inimical, to their managers’ or members’ 
interests. In these cases, reliance on self-regulation can be more of a 
hindrance than if promulgation or enforcement of rules were undertaken 
directly by the SEC or another regulator. 
II. SELF-DOUBT 
Although the premises of self-regulation have regularly been called into 
question, the concept has endured because lawmakers have generally 
regarded self-regulation to be a practical and efficient way to outsource the 
burdens of regulation to the private sector. Thus, despite the periodic 
scandals of exchange governance and member misconduct,22 Congress and 
the Commission have reacted to public lapses in confidence by expanding 
the scope of self-regulatory responsibility and the Commission’s oversight 
over SROs. In the present environment, by contrast, there is a growing lack 
of confidence on the part of SROs themselves and their own members in the 
axioms of self-regulation. This part discusses four reasons why self-
regulation is now under assault: the incremental federalization of self-
regulation, the diminishing representation of the securities industry in 
                                                                                                                 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2000) (“The rules of the exchange are designed to prevent 
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices . . . .”); id. § 78i(a) (prohibiting certain fraudulent 
conduct on exchanges). 
 21. See, e.g., Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50,700, 
69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,265–66 (Dec. 8, 2004) (describing the formation of the Intermarket 
Surveillance Group and its role in coordinating the enforcement efforts of its SRO members). 
 22. Joel Seligman, Cautious Evolution or Perennial Irresolution: Stock Market Self-
Regulation During the First Seventy Years of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 59 BUS. 
LAW. 1347, 1347–49 (2004). 
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SROs, the new-found self-interest of market-based SROs, and the difficulty 
in extending the concept of self-regulation internationally. 
A. THE FEDERALIZATION OF SELF-REGULATION 
One of the principal reasons for the decline of self-regulatory 
organizations may be the incremental federalization of securities law. While 
we think of the Exchange Act as creating a pervasive system of federal 
regulation, many elements of securities regulation were governed by rules 
of, or heavily influenced by, the eponymous exchanges for a significant part 
of the Act’s history. Incremental federalization may have been inevitable—
as it remains the one of the few tools Congress has to address the periodic 
scandals that shock the securities marketplace—but each successive tick of 
the one-way ratchet has reduced the autonomy of the securities industry, 
while increasing the costs and reputational stakes for SROs and their 
members. 
The most celebrated example of incremental federalization at the 
expense of state or SRO regulation is the development of disclosure and 
governance standards for public companies.23 For example, the Exchange 
Act, as originally enacted, largely limited the application of its periodic 
reporting, proxy solicitation, and insider reporting and trading provisions to 
exchange-listed firms.24 Thus, exchanges could play a representative role in 
negotiating the federal disclosure and governance standards for top-tier 
companies that sought national credibility. In 1964, following its Special 
Study of Securities Markets,25 the Commission gained the authority to 
extend these requirements to all over-the-counter issuers meeting the size 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See generally Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1993) 
(discussing the displacement of state corporate governance norms by federal regulation). 
 24. Sections 13, 14, and 16 of the Exchange Act extend only to an issuer of a security 
registered pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act (and in the case of section 16, only with 
respect to registered classes of equity security). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78n, 78p (Supp. II 
2002). Certain over-the-counter firms that effected a registered securities offering under the 
Securities Act of 1933 were required to include an undertaking to file “such supplementary and 
periodic information, documents, and reports as may be required pursuant to section 13” in respect 
of securities registered under section 12, but were not required to comply with the corporate 
governance provisions of sections 14 and 16. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b), 78l(d) (1958); SEC, 
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 3, at 2–7 (1963); Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 
Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 3(c), 78 Stat. 565 (adding subsection (g) to section 12 and amending section 
15(d) of the Exchange Act); see also H.R. REP. NO. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted 
in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3013, 3027 (describing the addition of section 12(g) to the Exchange Act 
“to provide for registration of securities traded in the over-the-counter market and for disclosure 
by issuers thereof comparable to the registration and disclosures required in connection with listed 
securities by section 12(b) of that act”); id. at. 3037 (describing the extension of the requirement 
under section 15(d) that each registration statement filed under the Securities Act “must contain an 
undertaking to comply with the reporting requirements of section 13” to all Securities Act 
registrants). 
 25. H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 3, at 7–17, 60–64. 
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and shareholder requirements of section 12(g).26 Moreover, beginning in the 
1970s and continuing to the present day, the Commission transformed the 
Exchange Act’s periodic disclosure requirements into a system of forward-
looking disclosure, rather than purely historical data. These developments 
considerably expanded the range of information required to be disclosed by 
all listed and unlisted companies, while simultaneously diminishing the 
scope and prestige of exchange standards.27 
Exchanges retain the incentives and discretion to promulgate qualitative 
governance rules and standards that are stricter than Commission 
requirements as a means of reputationally distinguishing their listed 
issues.28 Thus, in addition to the quantitative requirements for listing 
eligibility, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has historically imposed 
obligations such as real-time disclosure of certain material information 
during volatile market conditions, and corporate governance rules 
respecting the independence of auditors, directors, and audit committees.29 
NYSE listing agreements also continue to provide important protections for 
investors in exchange-listed securities by restricting the dilution of their 
voting rights in various corporate finance transactions.30 
Even in these areas, the Commission and Congress have sought to use 
exchange rules to further their regulatory goals. Exchange rulemaking and 
enforcement in the area of corporate governance, for example, often appears 
to have been prodded by the Commission as a means of circumventing 
statutory limitations on its own authority.31 Legislation such as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which appears to be the first to mandate specific 
listing standards through legislation,32 can only further erode the self-
regulatory principle that exchanges autonomously develop standards for 
corporate governance. 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565; Michael J. 
Simon & Robert L.D. Colby, The National Market System for Over-the-Counter Stocks, 55 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 17, 29–30 (1986). 
 27. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 465–66 (rev. ed. 
1995). 
 28. See Karmel, supra note 18, at 329–30. 
 29. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual §§ 202.03, 303A.00 (2006) [hereinafter NYSE 
LCM]. 
 30. Id. § 313.00(A). 
 31. Karmel, supra note 18, at 352; Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., ABA, Special Study on 
Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1490 
(2002). Prominent examples are the Commission’s efforts to require the NYSE to enforce its rule 
against dual class recapitalizations after its own Exchange Act Rule 19c-4 was vacated in Business 
Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and to require exchanges to adopt rules 
governing auditor independence in the late 1990s. See, e.g., Ira M. Millstein, Introduction to the 
Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of 
Corporate Audit Committees, 54 BUS. LAW. 1057 (1999). 
 32. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 775 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)). 
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Standardization of financial responsibility rules for securities 
intermediaries, such as net capital, customer protection, and bookkeeping 
requirements, has also figured prominently in the downsizing of the SRO’s 
special statutory mission.33 While the unique expertise and mutual interest 
of exchange members in upholding high standards of financial 
responsibility might have militated in favor of keeping these rules largely 
within the purview of SRO regulation, the back office crisis and subsequent 
insolvencies of several brokerage firms put these rules squarely on the 
federalization agenda in the 1960s. Initially, the Congressional reaction 
favored a self-regulatory approach to the problem of customer protection: 
the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 provided a self-regulatory 
model for customer protection under the auspices of the Securities Investor 
Protection Corporation.34 Within five years, however, Congress gave the 
Commission the authority to promulgate uniform net capital and customer 
protection rules for all registered broker-dealers.35 
Today, while exchanges might not impose significant additional net 
capital requirements by rule, exchanges such as the NYSE and the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange (CBOE) still play a very important role in the 
application and interpretation of the Commission’s rules and work closely 
with the Commission and the brokerage industry to adapt to marketplace 
developments. Two factors, however, threaten the future of this rela-
tionship. First, following the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, banking 
regulation can be expected to play a greater, if indirect, role in the standard 
setting process for financial responsibility rules.36 Second, with the 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Section 7(d) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 
1636, 1653, required the Commission to prescribe “safeguards with respect to the financial 
responsibility and related practices of brokers and dealers,” and in particular, “the maintenance of 
reserves with respect to customers’ deposits or credit balances.” See also Broker-Dealers; 
Maintenance of Certain Basic Reserves, 37 Fed. Reg. 25,224 (Nov. 29, 1972) (adopting the 
Commission’s customer protection rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3). Five years later, section 11(3) 
of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, amended section 
15(c)(3) of the Exchange Act to require the Commission to promulgate rules and regulations 
establishing minimum financial responsibility requirements for all brokers and dealers. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78o(c)(3) (2000). See also Adoption of Net Capital Rule, 40 Fed. Reg. 29,795, 29,795–96 (July 
16, 1975) (revisions to Commission’s net capital rule, pursuant to the Securities Acts 
Amendments of 1975, eliminating the exemption from the Commission’s net capital rule for 
members of designated national securities exchanges required to comply with net capital rules of 
such exchanges). 
 34. See infra note 106. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) insures customer 
securities and cash balances through a fund maintained by assessments from its membership, 
which generally includes all registered broker-dealers. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd (2000). SIPC has 
significant powers to intervene in bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings involving its members 
and is responsible for the distribution of securities and funds to customers of an insolvent 
brokerage firm. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78eee–78hhh (2000). 
 35. Steven L. Molinari & Nelson S. Kibler, Broker-Dealers’ Financial Responsibility under 
the Uniform Net Capital Rule—A Case for Liquidity, 72 GEO. L.J. 1, 14–16 (1983–1984). 
 36. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999), is generally 
said to have repealed the long-standing prohibition under the Glass-Steagall Act against the 
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internationalization of investment firms, there have been parallel efforts to 
regulate financial responsibility on a groupwide basis rather than at the 
level of the individual SEC-regulated brokerage firm,37 and to standardize 
capital requirements for all firms.38 While SROs attempt to exercise some 
oversight over the corporate parents of their members,39 the Commission is 
ultimately better positioned to enter into discussions with both domestic and 
foreign financial services regulators to harmonize such rules. 
SRO business conduct regulation, while still the SROs’ strongest suit, 
has also come under assault, particularly as a result of the expansion of 
private rights of action under Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 and increasing SEC 
rulemaking in all aspects of broker-dealers’ customer relations. SRO rules 
continue to govern the gray area that does not rise to the level of fraud but 
nevertheless falls short of “just and equitable principles of trade.”40 SROs, 
such as the NASD, also play a significant compliance role with respect to 
newly registered brokerage firms, including screening for disqualifications, 
examining for competence, ensuring adequate supervisory personnel, and 
overseeing the use of advertising and sales literature. Even here, however, 
the Commission has stepped up its own efforts by dedicating compliance 
personnel to the oversight of broker-dealer operations.41 The rise of 
                                                                                                                 
affiliation of commercial and investment banking. The Act permits bank holding companies that 
qualify as “financial holding companies” to provide other financial services—such as 
underwriting, brokerage, and insurance—through subsidiaries functionally regulated by the 
appropriate federal or state regulatory authority and under the “umbrella” supervision of the 
Federal Reserve Board. Id. at pt. [1]. Although the Federal Reserve Board may not generally apply 
capital standards to SEC-registered broker-dealer subsidiaries of a financial holding company, or 
look to such subsidiaries as a “source of strength” for a bank affiliate, id. § 111(c), the Board has 
stated that it “is responsible for assessing consolidated capital adequacy for FHCs with the 
ultimate objective of protecting the insured depository subsidiaries from the effects of disruptions 
in the nonbank portions of the organization.” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
SR Letter, SR 00-13 (SUP) (Aug. 15, 2000), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/SR LETTERS/2000/SR0013.HTM. 
 37. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i) (Supp. II 2002). This section was enacted as part of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 to provide a framework for Commission supervision of 
investment bank holding companies, including recordkeeping and reporting requirements and 
examination authority. See also Supervised Investment Bank Holding Companies, Exchange Act 
Release No. 49,831, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,472 (June 21, 2004) (adopting final rules creating a new 
framework for supervising an investment bank holding company). 
 38. Cf. States Demand Role in Basel II Plans, New York State Banking Regulator Says, 87 
Banking Daily (BNA) No. 10, at 388 (Sept. 18, 2006) (describing state bank regulators’ concerns 
that the process by which the Basel II capital accord is being implemented in the United States has 
been dominated by federal regulators). 
 39. NASD Rule 1017, Application for Approval of Change in Ownership, Control or Business 
Operation (2006) (requiring NASD approval for change in ownership or control of member 
firms); NYSE Rule 304(E), Allied Members and Approved Persons (2006) (requiring Exchange 
approval of persons who control a member or member organization). 
 40. Commission efforts to characterize unethical business practices as fraud must be 
predicated on implied representations or non-verbal conduct. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Is 
the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271 (1995) (describing the implied 
representations of broker-dealers that they will deal fairly with customers). 
 41. See infra Part III.A. 
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securities arbitration under SRO auspices may also have had the effect, at 
least in the context of private litigation, of eroding the boundary between 
SRO ethical norms and securities fraud. For example, arbitrators may, 
absent “manifest disregard of the law,” inadvertently impose liability for 
conduct that falls short of the judicially developed contours of Rule 10b-5.42 
Finally, the Commission’s significant rulemaking in the area of market 
structure has considerably undermined the autonomy of exchanges to 
regulate the structure of their own market operations. The justification for 
conferring disciplinary authority on exchanges is their comprehensive 
ability to oversee and control participation in trading through their facilities; 
the power to exclude subsumes the power to discipline. Once exchanges are 
no longer able—or permitted—to mandate consolidation of order flow 
through their facilities, the source of self-regulatory authority wanes 
considerably. As others have discussed, over the past seventy years the 
Commission has cajoled or required the primary exchanges to abandon 
mandatory minimum commission schedules, off-board trading prohibitions 
(both with respect to other exchanges and the over-the-counter market), and 
restrictions on the ability of management or shareholders to delist 
companies from an exchange.43 
Similarly, centralization of trading under Commission rules governing 
the national market system has supplanted the role traditionally played by 
exchanges and the NASD in developing priority, parity, and precedence 
rules for execution and execution quality and conflict-of-interest standards. 
Rules, such as the duty of best execution, order handling and routing 
obligations, and the prohibition against trading ahead of customer orders, 
are gradually being hardwired into inter-exchange communications systems 
built to Commission specifications.44 Experts may disagree as to whether 
limiting the discretion of broker-dealers to choose among competing trading 
systems is appropriate, but a collateral effect of such initiatives is to 
minimize the roles of SROs in promulgating and enforcing “just and 
equitable principles of trade.”45 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See, e.g., Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why Do Brokerage 
Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 415 (2003–2004). 
 43. Dale A. Oesterle, Regulation NMS: Has the SEC Exceeded Its Congressional Mandate to 
Facilitate a “National Market System” in Securities Trading?, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 613, 613–15 
(2005); Laura Nyantung Beny, U.S. Secondary Stock Markets: A Survey of Current Regulatory 
and Structural Issues and a Reform Proposal to Enhance Competition, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 399, 412–17, 462–63; Karmel, supra note 18, at 347–52. 
 44. NYSE Sees Best Execution Differently from Amex, Nasdaq, 38 Sec. L. Daily (BNA) No. 
30, at 1278 (July 18, 2006). SEC Chief Economist Chester Spatt suggested that “Regulation NMS 
to some extent ‘simplifies’ a broker-dealer’s duty of best execution by transferring some of the 
responsibility for best execution to the exchanges.” Id. See also Simon & Colby, supra note 26,  
at 27–28. 
 45. Compare Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structure as an Independent Variable in Assessing Stock 
Market Failures, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 547 (2004), Morris Mendelson & Junius W. Peake, 
Intermediaries’ or Investors’: Whose Market Is It Anyway?, 19 J. CORP. L. 443 (2000), and Yakov 
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B. THE CHANGING FACE OF SELF-REGULATION 
Another development affecting the vitality of SROs is their increasing 
bureaucratization. One of the core assumptions of self-regulation is that 
SROs will be representative of the industry they regulate. Each national 
securities exchange and registered securities association, for example, must 
“assure a fair representation of its members in the selection of its directors 
and administration of its affairs.”46 The public interest was to be advanced 
by requiring “one or more directors” who would be “representative of 
issuers and investors and not be associated with a member of the exchange, 
broker or dealer.”47 Moreover, an expectation existed that organizations 
representative of the securities industry would be involved in SRO 
governance, disciplinary activity, and day-to-day decisionmaking.48 
With the increasing size and specialization of SRO staff, SRO 
governance threatens to lose its representative status. Industry represen-
tation is largely confined to board oversight and member participation in the 
committee structure and disciplinary proceedings at various SROs.49 
Internal divisions between regulatory and operational arms further segregate 
                                                                                                                 
Amihud & Haim Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regulation of Securities Trading Across 
Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1411 (1996), with Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From 
Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563  
(2005), and Mark Klock, The SEC’s New Regulation ATS: Placing the Myth of Market 
Fragmentation Ahead of Economic Theory and Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 753 (1999). See, e.g., 
15 U.S.C.S §§ 78f(b)(5), 78o-3(b)(6), 78o-4(b)(2)(B), 78o-5(b)(3) (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring 
national securities exchanges, national securities associations, and registered clearing agencies to 
have rules designated to promote “just and equitable principles of trade”). 
 46. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78f(b)(3), 78o-3(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2006). 
 47. In practice, many exchanges sought to balance the number of “industry” directors on their 
boards with a comparable number of “public” (or “non-industry”) directors. The proposed 
definition of “independent” directors in the SEC rules appears to be more restrictive than the 
traditional “public” or “non-industry” classification under prior exchange rules. See Listing and 
Trading of Affiliated Securities by a Self-Regulatory Organization, Exchange Act Release No. 
50,699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126, 71,135 n.101 (reciting requirements of the Boston Stock Exchange’s 
Constitution and the former Pacific Exchange’s By-Laws establishing an equal proportion of 
“public” or “non-industry” and “industry” directors); NYSE CONST. art. 4, § 2 (CCH May 2002) 
(requiring, prior to the governance reforms contained in Exchange Act Release No. 48,946, that 
the board of the NYSE include, in addition to senior officers, 12 industry and 12 public directors); 
Letter from Neal Wolkoff, Acting CEO, AMEX, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Mar. 8, 
2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73904/nwolkoff 030805a.pdf (reflecting 
on AMEX’s experience with a “largely independent board composed of many highly respected 
and accomplished individuals with no ties to the securities industry”); Letter from Robert Glauber, 
Chairman and CEO, NASD, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC 8 (Mar. 8, 2005), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73904/rrglauber030805.pdf (noting that, pursuant to its 
undertakings in connection with the 1996 settlement described in the 21(a) Report, the “NASD 
maintains a majority Public and Non-Industry membership on its Board of Governors,” as defined 
in its by-laws and rules). 
 48. S. REP. NO. 75-1455, at 4–5 (1938) (describing the Maloney Act as creating a program of 
“cooperative regulation . . . [in which the task will be largely performed by] representative 
organizations of investment bankers, dealers, and brokers”). 
 49. Walter Says NASD Committed to Keeping ‘Self’ in Self-Regulation, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 37, at 1534 (Sept. 14, 2006) (describing member involvement in SRO governance). 
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persons involved in regulatory decisions from individuals with operational 
experience in the securities industry.50 It has also long been observed that 
the need to develop specialized compliance inspection and enforcement 
functions within each SRO results in the delegation of responsibility to full-
time paid staffs, who may or may not have managerial or operational 
experience in any of the SRO’s member firms.51 While this does not 
necessarily imply that familiarity with firm operations cannot be acquired, it 
does suggest a lack of identity on the basis of which to establish a claim of 
self-representation in self-regulation. 
Recent SEC initiatives would increase this trend toward greater 
independence from the securities industry. Proposed rules respecting SRO 
governance, for example, would require SRO boards to consist of a 
majority of independent directors.52 While the preference for outside 
directors is nothing new, stringent independence requirements would 
generally exclude individuals with any material ties to the securities 
industry.53 When combined with the effect of the SEC’s determination to 
permit for-profit exchanges (discussed below), member representation on 
SRO boards could decline to as little as 20%.54 The SEC’s SRO governance 
rules would also mandate greater separation between SROs’ regulatory and 
operational functions,55 and require internal controls to ensure regulatory 
monies do not subsidize operational activities.56 
These developments will have numerous consequences on self-
regulation. As SRO personnel begin to look more like the SEC, it will be 
increasingly difficult to envision SROs performing the traditional buffering 
function between industry competition and SEC regulation. Instead, SROs, 
such as the NASD, are likely to behave as if they are an extension of the 
Commission’s own compliance and enforcement arms, with the added 
benefit that they are subsidized by industry fees and not constrained by the 
same statutory limitations on their power. NASD rulemaking initiatives, for 
example, may become increasingly driven by pressure from the 
Commission, rather than pressure for coordination by the industry. 
                                                                                                                 
 50. See infra text accompanying notes 68–71. 
 51.  See, e.g., Sam Scott Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securities Market: A Critical 
Examination, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 862–63 (1985) (citing William L. Cary, Self-
Regulation in the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A. J. 244, 247 (1963); SEC, REPORT OF THE 
SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 4, at 602). 
 52. Listing and Trading of Affiliated Securities by a Self-Regulatory Organization, 69 Fed. 
Reg. at 71,126. 
 53. See id. (defining “independent director”); see, e.g., Walter Says NASD Committed to 
Keeping ‘Self’ in Self-Regulation, supra note 49 (noting that the NASD Board of Governors has 7 
industry directors out of 18 and NYSE regulation has no industry representation). 
 54. See Listing and Trading of Affiliated Securities by a Self-Regulatory Organization, 69 Fed. 
Reg. at 71,126 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.6a-5(c)(5)). 
 55. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.6a-5(n)(1), 240.15Aa-3(n)(1)). 
 56. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.6a-5(n)(4), 240.15Aa-3(n)(4)). 
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More importantly, the agenda of self-regulators may retreat 
significantly from areas outside of the SEC’s competence or expertise. 
Many aspects of today’s securities markets are not subject to direct 
regulation by the Commission—such as over-the-counter derivatives 
transactions and corporate debt markets. These are areas in which SROs 
truly representative of the securities industry might make headway in 
spearheading the development of business conduct norms, much as the U.S. 
Treasury Department and Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) 
have developed idiosyncratic rules for the government and municipal 
securities markets. The NASD has made only modest forays into such 
issues, presumably because the industry has no desire to see Commission-
dominated SROs creep into areas outside of the SEC’s direct oversight. 
C SELF-INTEREST 
Even as recent trends have aligned the interests of SRO regulatory 
personnel with those of the SEC, they have created even greater 
opportunities for SRO operational personnel to leverage the value of their 
special statutory status. Historically, exchanges and other SROs were 
operated as not-for-profit organizations. While a limited number of exempt 
exchanges were permitted to operate on a for-profit basis outside of the 
statutory regime, exchanges largely existed to furnish facilities “for the 
convenient transaction of business by its members.”57 Abuses of exchange 
management, however frequent, were usually for the benefit of one faction 
(e.g., specialists or floor brokers) at the expense of another.58 The 
profitability of a seat on the exchange and the access it conferred to its 
exclusive information and services, moreover, deterred members from 
“turning them into shares” that could be offered to the public.59 
Although the Commission has acknowledged that national securities 
exchanges could be organized as for-profit entities, several factors 
contributed to the current trend to seek for-profit status.60 First, technology 
made pure brokerage profitable. New electronic trading systems capitalized 
on technological improvements to offer more efficient, if non-traditional, 
venues for trade execution without sponsoring the intermediation of a 
dealer.61 Virtually all of these systems were permitted to operate as 
registered broker-dealers in the United States, rather than as exchanges, in 
                                                                                                                 
 57. NYSE CONST. art. I, § 2(a). 
 58. See Seligman, supra note 22, at 1355. 
 59. Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats Into Shares: Causes and Implications of 
Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L. REV. 367, 372–73 (2002). See 
also Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2564–
66 (2006). 
 60. Exchange Act Release No. 38,672, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,485, 30,486 (June 4, 1997). 
 61. See, e.g., Macey & O’Hara, supra note 13 (describing technological advances that affect 
trading). 
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order to facilitate their proliferation.62 The mutual structure of the primary 
exchanges, encumbered as it was by members’ (and in particular, 
specialists’) self-interest, prevented the adoption of new execution tech-
nologies in favor of traditional intermediated trading. To the extent that 
many brokerage firms were investing in competing execution or market 
making technologies,63 exchange members increasingly found themselves 
in direct competition with their regulators.64 
Second, Commission rulemaking requires SROs to build linkage 
systems that would serve as the basis for intermarket connectivity. The 
Commission had long pressed exchanges and the NASD to develop 
technologies to improve execution quality for retail investors by facilitating 
access to their members’ published quotations.65 This eventually placed 
SROs—particularly, the NASD—in direct competition with members who 
operated electronic trading or market making systems, because they were 
essentially building systems that would eliminate internalization of orders 
in favor of a centralized (if not mandatory) limit order book.66 In particular, 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Exchange Act Release No. 38,672, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,486. One system, the Arizona Stock 
Exchange, has been recognized as an “exchange” operating pursuant to a limited volume 
exemption from registration under section 5 of the Exchange Act. See Order Amending 
Exemption Order and Granting Amendment to Application for Exemption from Registration as an 
Exchange under section 5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 
37,271, 61 Fed. Reg. 29,145 (June 3, 1996). To the extent that a limited-volume business model 
forecloses any benefits from economies of scale, it is not surprising that few trading systems have 
pursued such regulatory classification. 
 63. See Mark Borrelli, Market Making in the Electronic Age, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 815, 817 
(2001). 
 64. See Gaston F. Ceron, Moving the Market: Big Board Sets Expansion In Electronic 
Trading, WALL ST. J, Aug. 28, 2006, at C3 (describing concerns of NYSE specialists and brokers 
that the lifting of the limits on electronic trading could sideline them and hurt their profits). 
 65. See Order Granting Temporary Approval, On An Accelerated Basis to a Proposed Rule 
Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. to Establish the Order 
Confirmation Transaction Service Enhancement to the NASDAQ System, Exchange Act Release 
No. 25,263, 53 Fed. Reg. 1430 (Jan 19, 1988) (approving Nasdaq’s SelectNet Service, formerly 
the Order Confirmation Transaction Service, on a temporary accelerated basis); National 
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Release No. 
21,743, 50 Fed. Reg. 7432 (Feb. 22, 1985) (approving Nasdaq’s Small Order Execution Service). 
See also Simon & Colby, supra note 26, at 73–76. 
 66. For example, in its application for registration as a freestanding national securities 
exchange, Nasdaq agreed to limit “Nasdaq Exchange transactions” to those trades that are 
“executed in the Exchange’s systems and to amend its Exchange systems to require executions to 
occur pursuant” to price- and (with certain exceptions) time-priority rules. See, e.g., In re Nasdaq 
Stock Market, Exchange Act Release No. 53,128, 71 Fed. Reg. 3550, 3550–51 (Jan. 23, 2006). 
This amendment obviated the need for the Commission to reconsider whether exchanges must 
have a central limit order book that ensures some price/time priority over dealer trades on the 
exchange. Id. at 3550–51; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16 (2006) (interpreting the statutory 
definition of an “exchange” in section 3 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(1), to require the 
use of “established, non-discretionary methods . . . under which . . . orders interact with each 
other, and the buyers and sellers entering such orders agree to the terms of a trade”). It eliminated, 
however, the ability of members (such as market makers) to “preference” execution of customer 
orders against a designated quoting market participant’s quote, irrespective of time priority, as 
long as the quote matched the contemporaneous best bid/best offer. See, e.g., Former NASD Rule 
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SROs could offer the unique proposition of disintermediation and 
regulatory imprimatur. Why pay a market maker or an alternative trading 
system to display your order in Nasdaq when you can display your order 
directly in Nasdaq? Why risk a poor execution in an alternative trading 
system, when you are guaranteed an execution quality price on the NYSE? 
Together with trade-through rules that favor established markets, exchanges 
had a competitive edge over their members.67 
Third, the Commission’s separation of regulatory and operational 
functions within SROs made it possible for SROs to operate their facilities 
as profitable subsidiaries. In 1996, following the Nasdaq market making 
scandal, the NASD was required, inter alia, to segregate its market 
operations (which became the Nasdaq Stock Market) from its regulatory 
operations (NASD Regulation).68 Parallel with, if not as a consequence of, 
the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the governance 
reforms following the public debate over NYSE CEO Richard Grasso’s 
compensation package, the Commission proposed to extend this structural 
segregation to other exchanges.69 The Commission has also proposed to 
revamp the rules of exchange governance to require greater transparency 
and segregation of the regulatory and trading operations of SROs. And just 
as Nasdaq has spun off from the NASD to be a freestanding SRO (having 
delegated its self-regulatory responsibility to the NASD), the NYSE has 
formally separated its regulatory and business operations into independent 
subsidiaries to reduce conflicts of interest.70 
With autonomy and the prospect of profitability, electronic trading 
could be used not only to improve member access to public quotes, but to 
supplant member activity in the over-the-counter markets. Nasdaq could 
transform its system for displaying and providing execution access to 
member quotations into an electronic trading system that would rival its 
competitors in the over-the-counter market. NYSE, AMEX, and the 
                                                                                                                 
4710(b)(1)(B)(ii)(b) (CCH Jan. 2005). Thus, a market maker may not preferentially execute 
customer transactions against its own quote “on or through” the facilities of the Nasdaq Exchange. 
 67. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.611 (2005) (requiring trading centers to establish, maintain and 
enforce policies reasonably designed to prevent transactions on their markets that “trade-through” 
the protected quotations of other markets in NMS stocks). 
 68. SEC, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
REGARDING THE NASD AND THE NASDAQ MARKET (Aug. 8, 1996), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/nasdaq21a.htm. 
 69. Listing and Trading of Affiliated Securities by a Self-Regulatory Organization, Exchange 
Act Release No. 50,699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126, 71,129–30 (describing the proposed governance 
reforms adopted by the NYSE in December 2003 in the context of “Governance Concerns” 
relating to issuers of exchange-listed securities and to the NYSE itself in connection with its 
Chairman’s compensation package, and the concomitant concerns over weaknesses in the 
regulatory programs of other SROs). 
 70. Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1, 3, and 5 
Thereto and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment Nos. 6 and 
8 Relating to the NYSE’s Business Combination With Archipelago Holdings, Inc., Exchange Act 
Release No. 53,382, 71 Fed. Reg. 11,251–52 (Mar. 6, 2006). 
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regional exchanges, meanwhile, could build systems that would bypass 
exchange specialists or market makers, rather than rely upon their negative 
obligation to refrain from trading in an otherwise liquid market.71 
 Fourth, a for-profit structure was more conducive to expansion in 
the technology boom of the late 1990s. Raising capital as a non-profit 
membership organization would entail higher regulatory or trading fees, 
and thus would require membership and Commission scrutiny of each 
initiative. By contrast, a public offering, followed by strategic acquisitions 
for stock, allows SROs to expand operational capabilities rapidly by 
purchasing boutique technology firms rather than develop proprietary 
technologies.72 Nasdaq’s acquisition of Instinet and NYSE’s merger with 
Archipelago—the two ECNs with the largest market share of National 
Market System (NMS) order flow—could not have taken place without 
access to capital markets.73 Publicly held stock may also facilitate mergers 
with similarly structured international exchanges to the extent that cross-
border trading or technological synergies exist.74 
The potential adverse consequences of the for-profit transformation are 
manifest. SROs may lose their focus on serving as regulators for the 
securities industry and instead concentrate on maximizing shareholder 
revenues.75 From an economic perspective, this is unobjectionable. There 
are many regulated industries (e.g., the telecommunications industry) where 
private companies operate public utilities and dictate (to a degree) the terms 
of competition for their competitors. But in no sense of the word are such 
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visited Oct. 20, 2006) (describing Boston Options Exchange Group LLC, a joint venture among 
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 75. James D. Cox, Brands vs. Generics: Self-Regulation by Competitors, 2000 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 15, 19 (2000). 
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specially licensed firms considered self-regulators representative of their 
customers⎯at least no more than a taxicab medallion transforms a New 
York cab driver into a traffic cop. Moreover, there is no consensus that 
stock exchanges are essential utilities, the quotations of which must be 
accessible by all broker-dealers, as long as common members are able to 
limit significant price variations across markets.76 
A second consequence of this transformation is the impact on public 
perception of the fairness of the marketplace.77 One of the important 
ceremonial duties of SROs is to take public remedial measures to address 
misconduct by their members and listed issuers so that Congress and the 
Commission do not have to resort to the more cumbersome combination of 
legislation and regulation. When exchanges themselves become the source 
of scandal, this function is lost. The scandal surrounding NYSE CEO 
Richard Grasso’s compensation package, for example, while in theory 
solely a concern of the members of the exchange (as a private company), 
reflects the sense of civic responsibility to which SRO management is 
(thought to be) held.78 This level of public accountability will no longer be 
tenable when SRO shareholders require that their agents operate with the 
morals of the marketplace. 
D. CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND JOINT VENTURES 
The globalization imperative has permeated the financial services 
sector. Shareholders of both the NYSE Group and Euronext, one of the 
largest non-U.S. stock exchanges, have approved the merger of the two 
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of the New York Stock Exchange into Archipelago Holdings, Inc. the prior day. See Steve Gelsi, 
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entities.79 Deutsche Börse and Borsa Italiana have also at various times 
been in negotiations to join the NYSE-Euronext combination.80 Meanwhile, 
Nasdaq has gradually increased its stake in the London Stock Exchange 
even as its increasing hostile takeover offers have been rebuffed.81 More 
modest initiatives have also taken place, such as the Boston Stock 
Exchange’s joint venture with the Montreal Stock Exchange to develop a 
common operating platform for options trading.82 And yet, to date, the 
Commission has addressed only in the broadest terms how or on what terms 
a non-U.S. stock exchange can maintain a presence in the United States 
without running afoul of the statutory prohibition against trading by U.S. 
brokers on unregistered exchanges.83 
On the one hand, the Commission cannot deny the inevitable 
conglomeration of national exchanges into transnational exchanges.84 
Investors have reaped significant benefits from the consolidation of regional 
exchanges in the United States and national exchanges in the EU in terms of 
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access to trading opportunities, variety of listed securities, and 
improvements in exchange technology and services.85 At present, cross-
border synergies must come primarily from the latter, since the resulting 
business combinations will operate largely as holding companies for 
separately regulated and operated national exchanges.86 But cross-border 
mergers would ultimately prove meaningless if U.S. institutional and retail 
investors were unable to trade directly with European investors or if the 
current restrictions on contact between non-U.S. brokers and exchanges 
were to remain in place. 
On the other hand, the Commission is reluctant to concede that U.S. 
federal regulation or self-regulation stops at the U.S. border. U.S. disclosure 
standards for exchange-listed companies would rapidly lose significance if 
the SEC did not hold all companies listed on cross-border exchanges up to 
the same standards as if they had a significant U.S. shareholder base. U.S. 
investors would potentially be exposed to more manipulative or deceptive 
conduct (as defined by the Commission) if foreign exchanges are subject to 
laxer standards than U.S. markets. One might expect that international 
efforts at harmonizing regulatory standards will pave the way for common 
rules of market conduct,87 but the longstanding difficulties in reaching an 
agreement on accounting standards suggests that such efforts will be 
protracted.88 
Exchanges face a dilemma of sorts as well. They could, consistent with 
current regulations, attempt to rig cross-border trading and listing 
mechanisms that provide some appearance of cross-border activity to U.S. 
investors. Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, for example, the NYSE 
had developed a special body of listing standards that it had aggressively 
marketed to non-U.S. companies.89 Exchanges could quietly offer cross-
border trading opportunities in non-U.S. securities through the facilities of 
their members with U.S. affiliates, in the same manner as many electronic 
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trading systems operated by U.S. investment banks and brokerage firms 
provided access to foreign markets.90 Foreign derivatives exchanges, 
conversely, could to a limited extent familiarize U.S. investors and 
intermediaries with their products even though they could not be “offered” 
in the United States.91 
A full-scale cross-border linkage, however, would either entail 
enforcing U.S. regulation abroad (consistent with SRO’s gatekeeping 
responsibilities), or require exchanges to shed their own SRO responsi-
bilities (at least with respect to federal law).92 In other contexts, the lower 
standard of gatekeeping responsibility has made it easier to permit such 
cross-border access. In the U.S. commodity futures markets, where the 
regulatory responsibilities of designated contract markets are more limited, 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has permitted foreign 
exchanges to offer electronic access to U.S. Future Commissions Merchants 
(FCMs) through an informal regulatory process.93 In the EU, the Investment 
Services Directive (soon to be replaced by the even more ambitious 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, or MiFID) has similarly 
permitted investment firms in any EU member state to obtain remote access 
to the regulated markets of any other EU member state based on a system of 
coordinated home/host country regulation.94 Because listing and trading on 
U.S. exchanges triggers the full application of U.S. federal securities law—
and requires U.S. exchanges to enforce that law as part of their statutory 
mandate95—U.S. exchanges have struggled to keep up in the global mergers 
race. 
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III. SELF-IMPROVEMENT 
Despite significant ambivalence about the future of self-regulation, the 
reform proposals advanced by the industry and the Commission do not 
break new ground.96 This is in part because the NASD and the Commission 
have subtly transformed themselves to fill the gaps in traditional market-
based self-regulation. Given the Commission’s SRO governance initiatives 
and the NASD’s own reputation of being too removed from its 
membership’s interests, it is hard to see any benefit from completely 
revamping the Exchange Act to eliminate or curtail self-regulation.97 
Indeed, the presence of multiple SROs under one or more hybrid models 
might well complement the Commission’s and the NASD’s authority by 
providing a greater degree of responsiveness and representativeness to the 
regulatory framework. The success of any such model would depend on an 
appropriate allocation of responsibilities. 
A. NO SRO? 
Proposals for reforming regulation of the securities industry with a 
dominant regulator not beholden to the industry would replace SROs with 
direct Commission regulation or a new non-industry regulator along the 
lines of the PCAOB. It is difficult to believe that direct Commission 
regulation of registered broker-dealers alone could replace self-regulation. 
It may appear inevitable that the Commission will continue to take steps in 
this direction,98 given the international trend of replacing self-regulation of 
individual markets with oversight by a single governmental or non-
governmental regulator.99 In addition to its traditional enforcement activities 
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under the antifraud laws, the Commission has established an Office of 
Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) to administer a 
“nationwide examination and inspection program for registered self-
regulatory organizations, broker-dealers, transfer agents, clearing agencies, 
investment companies, and investment advisers.”100 The Commission staff 
also frequently consults with industry personnel about risk management 
issues, in part under the aegis of its material associated persons reporting 
requirements. The Commission’s unpleasant experience with the short-lived 
SECO program, however, has discouraged it from arrogating an exclusive 
role in the regulatory process.101 In addition to the significant financial cost 
of maintaining the compliance and enforcement staff necessary to make 
such regulation feasible, there is the added difficulty of adopting and 
interpreting rules to govern industry conduct within the confines of the 
Administrative Procedure Act.102 
Moreover, if a new non-governmental regulator were employed, it is 
hard to see how any such regulator would differ significantly from the 
NASD, which has already emerged as the de facto exclusive regulator of 
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brokerage firms for most aspects of broker-dealer business conduct.103 The 
allure of a universal non-industry regulator would appear to be twofold: its 
members would be appointed by the Commission, and it would derive its 
funding from a statutory levy on broker-dealers, rather than membership 
dues and service fees.104 Putting aside concerns about the constitutionality 
of such a structure,105 legislatively chartered self-regulatory organizations 
such as the MSRB as well as quasi-SRO membership organizations such as 
SIPC have long successfully combined executive/Commission appoint-
ments and industry representation.106 Preserving a general statute of SRO 
registration, rather than chartering individual SROs by legislation, may also 
facilitate the formation, consolidation, and dissolution of specialty SROs 
without the need for Congressional intervention. 
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While it is in the Commission’s interest to reduce the reliance upon 
cross-subsidization of SRO regulatory activities, the necessity of formally 
removing this authority from the regulatory body—by establishing statutory 
assessments or levies on members or market participants—is unclear. To a 
degree, the regulatory monopoly on other revenue sources has distorted the 
efficiency of market operations because the Commission has never sought 
to ensure that SROs will dedicate those funds for regulatory purposes rather 
than operational objectives.107 Disentangling SRO services from SRO 
funding and requiring a separate source of funding for member regulation 
would improve SRO accounting and accountability. But this is unrelated to 
whether SROs are able to set appropriate fees for the regulation of their 
members. It may be far more efficient to eliminate cross-subsidies for 
regulation and allow SROs to set membership fees, than to mandate 
member assessments or a statutory levy. 
B. IS THERE A NEED FOR “MARKET BASED” SELF-REGULATION? 
If some consolidation of member supervision is desirable, should other 
self-regulatory responsibilities also be consolidated? “Market based” self-
regulation may be justified by a desire on the part of the Commission and 
individual exchanges to retain flexibility in governing the obligations of 
market makers and specialists and to facilitate variety in trading rules while 
ensuring compatibility with intermarket systems.108 For example, the 
Commission has expressed concern that since trading rules currently 
governing the conduct of market makers and specialists differ to a sufficient 
degree from exchange to exchange that it might be difficult to implement a 
single SRO model.109 In practice, such trading rules may not need to be 
subject to Commission approval if the Commission were to use its authority 
to define what the affirmative and negative obligations (if any) of market 
makers and specialists should be.110 Given the difficulty of drafting such 
rules, the Commission has preferred to exercise the right to disapprove of 
individual rule changes. 
                                                                                                                 
 107. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Rethinking Securities Markets: The SEC Advisory Committee on 
Market Information and the Future of the National Market System, 57 BUS. LAW 637, 659–61 
(2002). 
 108. See, e.g., SIA White Paper, supra note 1, at pt. III.E.3 (“[A disadvantage of a single SRO 
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corresponding surveillance programs is forfeited.”). 
 109. Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50,700, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 71,256, 71,280 (Dec. 8, 2004). 
 110. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-1 (2006); Simon & Trkla, supra note 15, at 346–47. 
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The Commission’s wariness is not altogether unreasonable, given that 
different products will require different levels of intermediation as 
circumstances change. For example, the Commission has observed that 
options exchanges may require different trading rules than stock exchanges 
because of the greater need for market intermediaries and member-
generated quotations in less liquid options markets.111 But this is equally 
true for other products which do not necessarily trade on exchanges. As 
discussed below, it may be preferable to develop uniform criteria for 
intermediation by product, rather than through a system in which the 
Commission haggles with individual SROs over rule changes in an attempt 
to ensure no one exchange has an advantage over the others.112 Individual 
markets may then seek no-action or exemptive relief if their proposed 
trading rules come into conflict with Commission or SRO rules, much as 
other securities intermediaries do today. 
Second, uniformity in market structure does not necessarily require 
exchange-based self-regulation. If a central limit order book or display 
facility for all securities were envisioned, it would make sense for a single 
utility or regulator to take charge of the operation of that system (whether it 
be the NASD or a separately constituted SRO for that purpose). Likewise, if 
the Commission were ultimately to determine that competitive forces 
should guide the centralization of order flow, the role of a market utility 
SRO would consist exclusively of collecting and displaying market 
information (much like the NASD’s Alternative Display Facility or SIAC’s 
CQ and CT Services). In such a world, exchange markets would essentially 
be first among equals, but would not enjoy special privileges (or incur 
special obligations) as a result of their primacy in the marketplace. 
The Commission’s pursuit of an intermediate market structure—
involving automated execution of public orders across markets through 
intermarket linkages113—creates the need for a series of hubs through which 
orders may be publicly displayed and accessed by other market centers and 
broker-dealers. Regulation of SRO “market” rules provides a convenient 
way for the Commission to ensure enhanced oversight over the critical 
joints in the marketplace while continuing to espouse a policy of competing 
trading venues with hardwired linkages. But other regulatory categories 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Competitive Developments in the Options Markets, Exchange Act Release No. 49,175, 69 
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 112. For example, if certain thresholds of payment for order flow or internalization are tolerated 
on options exchanges as a means of encouraging market maker participation, such standards could 
be developed by an options SRO, independent of any single options market, and applied across the 
board to all options exchanges. See id. at 6130–31 (discussing concerns with exchange payments 
for order flow, specialist guarantees, and internalization on options exchanges and the options 
exchanges’ conflicts of interest). 
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exist—such as the securities information processor (SIP)—which could 
perform the same function (with some legislative modification). A network 
of registered SIPs, like telecommunications providers or public utilities, 
could be regulated as essential facilities of the marketplace—subject to fair 
access requirements and reasonable rates—without the need for the full 
complement of SRO rules.114 More importantly, such franchises could be 
awarded on the basis of the superiority of their connectivity, rather than be 
awarded by default to legacy exchanges who have had significant incentives 
to diminish interaction of their captive order flow with the rest of the 
market. 
C. SEPARATION OF PROMULGATION, COMPLIANCE, AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
Another frequently mentioned approach to reforming self-regulation is 
to separate SRO functions by process, rather than subject matter. The 
Exchange Act currently exposes SROs to disciplinary sanction if they fail to 
enforce the rules they promulgate.115 Some commentators have suggested 
that the task of promulgating rules need not be performed by the same 
entity that is responsible for ensuring compliance with or prosecuting 
violations of those rules.116 Thus, one could employ a universal regulator 
for compliance inspections and enforcement of the rules of several different 
SROs. In other situations, SRO standard setting—without any formal 
compliance or enforcement process—might permit a degree of regulatory 
supervision over activities that would not be feasible if the SRO were 
compelled by the Exchange Act to enforce such rules through formal 
disciplinary action. 
This model is in use today in areas where the Commission’s 
jurisdictional authority brushes against other domestic regulatory 
authorities. For example, in the government and municipal securities 
markets, where both banks and broker-dealers are able to act as government 
or municipal securities brokers and dealers, rulemaking authority is given to 
one body (the MSRB and the Secretary of the Treasury, respectively), while 
compliance and enforcement activities are undertaken by an “appropriate 
regulatory authority.”117 Regional exchanges have outsourced many of their 
compliance and enforcement functions to the NASD,118 while the SEC has 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Onnig H. Dombalagian, Licensing the Word on the Street: The SEC’s Role in Regulating 
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long required the selection of an exclusive “designated examining 
authority” for monitoring compliance with financial responsibility rules.119 
The SEC and Department of Justice are responsible for civil and criminal 
enforcement actions, respectively, under the federal securities laws.120 The 
CFTC and SEC jointly promulgate rules for security futures products and 
security futures exchanges, while each separately undertakes disciplinary 
and enforcement action with respect to registered FCMs and broker-dealers 
respectively. 
There are clear advantages to such a model. Industry participants in 
SRO governance are best positioned to identify emerging practices that 
require greater regulatory scrutiny and to define appropriate norms of 
business conduct. They may, however, be more reluctant to explore new 
theories of liability if there is a possibility that their own firms may have 
engaged in similar conduct. To the extent that securities markets become 
increasingly specialized, it may be desirable to have SROs composed of 
representative industry members dedicated to rulemaking for particular 
products or market sectors, as discussed in Part IV, infra.121 Subject to the 
SEC’s oversight and coordination, a universal compliance and enforcement 
SRO could make it easier for industry leaders to participate more 
effectively in the articulation of “just and equitable principles of trade” 
without the duplication of enforcement personnel. 
For instruments that are not directly subject to regulation by financial 
regulators, industry SROs may provide some market discipline for 
intermediaries even in the absence of a formal compliance or enforcement 
regime. There may be areas where SROs might be more willing to 
undertake information-gathering initiatives—such as centralized monitoring 
of credit exposure—if the information gathered thereby will not be used for 
enforcement purposes other than determining eligibility for continued SRO 
membership or initiating internal disciplinary proceedings. Many such 
functions are performed under the aegis of trade associations today, but an 
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“SRO-lite” regime would provide a modicum of public accountability and 
SEC involvement. 
This model also has the potential to simplify cross-border regulation. 
SROs might, for example, adopt rules governing the conduct of their U.S. 
and non-U.S. members, which could be enforced under each country’s 
securities or commercial law regime. For example, the Commission and the 
NASD could serve as the enforcement authorities for such SRO rules in the 
United States, while other jurisdictions might elect to provide for the 
enforcement of SRO rules through disciplinary action by a regulated market 
or government regulator, private rights of action under contract or 
commercial fraud regimes, or some other industry sanction. Current 
memoranda of understanding among securities regulators could be 
amplified, as cross-border activities expand, to facilitate parallel 
enforcement and, where necessary, negotiate the minimum level of 
protection U.S. and non-U.S. regulators might require for any self-
regulatory regime. The Commission could thus maintain the view that such 
markets are governed by uniform rules, although the details of inspections 
and enforcement would vary by jurisdiction. 
The risks of this model are evident. Any separation of rulemaking and 
enforcement powers would raise concerns about inconsistent interpretation, 
underallocation or overallocation of enforcement resources to particular 
rules, and the resolution of redundancies across multiple SROs.122 The 
Commission (in coordination with foreign regulatory or self-regulatory 
authorities) would have to exert significant authority both upon the 
approval of promulgated rules and in the course of its oversight of SRO 
disciplinary and enforcement actions to ensure that consistency is 
maintained. The Commission would also have to orchestrate the allocation 
of responsibilities among substantive rule promulgators to avoid gaps and 
conflicts. For example, different products may entail different rules 
governing advertising, capital and margin requirements, execution 
standards, and clearance and settlement mechanisms. Ensuring that such 
rules operate as interoperable modules in the face of latent conflicts or 
conflicting interpretive guidance would require the Commission to use its 
authority to modify or amend SRO rules more aggressively than it has in 
the past. 
IV. SELF-ACTUALIZATION 
There are many directions that the self-regulatory structure of the 
marketplace could take, depending largely on whether the securities 
                                                                                                                 
 122. One possibility is to take advantage of the Exchange Act’s existing if neglected concept  
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industry prefers predictability and certainty to autonomy and accountability. 
If the fundamental concept of self-regulation remains valid, the task is to 
define those circumstances in which the industry’s efforts may be deployed 
to serve the shared collective interest in minimum standards of conduct, 
while centralizing or even federalizing other areas where greater conflicts 
with the public interest are perceived to arise. 
A. SRO V. NON-SRO ACTIVITIES 
As discussed in Part I, supra, self-regulation stands the best chance of 
succeeding when the SRO is responsible for enforcing mutual or reciprocal 
norms of conduct which require industry expertise to administer. Thus, 
execution protocols, clearance and settlement functions, risk management, 
and sales and marketing practices for emerging products are all likely to 
remain within SRO control. By contrast, there are several aspects of the 
current self-regulatory system, where as a result of Congressional or 
Commission action, the potential for an effective self-regulatory role has 
gradually disappeared. In these cases, one can envision replacing SRO 
regulation with a combination of Commission regulation and a universal 
NASD-like regulator or a licensed technology provider. 
A national market system mechanism for disseminating quotation and 
transaction information mandated by the Commission could be centralized 
and operated independently of existing SROs.123 While individual markets 
remain free to choose the types of information they would like to disclose 
and on what terms, the Commission has preempted the role of self-
regulation by dictating the minimum information that must be disclosed: by 
all market centers through intermarket mechanisms: SROs exercise at best 
residual authority to implement the technical requirements of those 
mandates—for example, distinguishing reportable trades from non-
reportable ones, specifying the information to be provided and the 
timeframes within which they must be reported. These functions, however, 
could best be performed by the Commission or single regulator, or by a 
national market system plan with broad industry representation.124 
Alternatively, rules could be established by individual product regulators 
for the industry, but actual systems would be maintained (and revenues 
would be collected and distributed) by an independent service provider. 
Corporate governance standards are another area where the mandate for 
centralization under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act increasingly makes SRO 
regulation an artifact. Congress and the Commission have increasingly 
resorted to codifying the costs and benefits of exchange listing—e.g., 
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exemption from blue-sky rules125 in exchange for heightened corporate 
governance standards.126 Exchanges, meanwhile, have shown increasingly 
less stomach for enforcing rules that threaten to erode the number of new 
and existing listed companies.127 Codifying higher corporate governance 
standards for companies that trade in highly liquid markets can take place in 
other fora—such as an NMS plan or as a condition of becoming a publicly 
quoted company. Markets again would remain free to set their own 
additional standards, but would be relieved of their historical gatekeeping 
function. 
More generally, an attitudinal shift should take place in which an 
SRO’s enforcement obligations do not include policies and procedures to 
monitor for compliance with and enforce Commission rulemaking. SROs 
are more than capable of undertaking a cost/benefit assessment with respect 
to the enforcement of their rules, but have no real discretion with respect to 
their statutory obligation to enforce federal law. This creates an exceptional 
hurdle for any new SRO that seeks to register as an exchange or national 
securities association, while imposing little, if any, real sanctions on 
existing SROs that fail to live up to that responsibility. If any of the hybrid 
models is adopted, a single self-regulator such as the NASD could be made 
responsible for this statutory mandate, while allowing other SROs the 
freedom to devote limited resources to achieve more modest regulatory 
goals. 
B. MULTIPLE REGULATORS 
As suggested above, if a single regulator system is adopted, other SROs 
could play an important, if peripheral, role in setting standards for industry 
conduct. Many complaints are raised about the monolithic nature of SRO 
rulemaking, whether it be domination of self-regulatory bodies by major 
investment firms, the imposition of uniform rules on dissimilar products, or 
structural differences in business practices. A system of multiple SROs with 
clear mandates, minimal overlap, and sufficient members to demonstrate 
credibility and minimize abuse may assuage some of these concerns. 
One possible demarcation would be based on size and geographic 
scope. The Maloney Act contemplated the registration of multiple national 
securities associations, as long as “the number and geographical distribution 
of its members and the scope of their transactions” was sufficient to enable 
each such association to carry out the purposes of the Act.128 A case could 
be made that smaller or regional brokerage firms might prefer a degree of 
autonomy to define their own business practices, or at least to distance 
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themselves from the bulge bracket firms that are perceived to exercise 
inordinate influence over the NASD and NYSE. Such arrangements could 
also facilitate the de-registration of regional exchanges by allowing their 
members to reorganize as a looser regional securities association with a 
more limited set of rules enforced by the NASD. 
In principle, such associations should not be objectionable since the 
informal segregation of bulge bracket and smaller brokerage firms exists 
today to a certain degree. The roster of NYSE member organizations 
includes nearly all of the bulge bracket investment banks headquartered in 
New York City.129 As a result, these firms are subject to NYSE rules (as 
well as NASD rules, if they are engaged in public business) and NYSE 
enforcement, while the nation’s remaining broker-dealers are subject to 
NASD rules (as well as regional exchange rules) and NASD 
enforcement.130 Federal financial responsibility rules also provide special 
provisions for computing the net capital and customer reserve requirements 
of the largest investment banks. 
The question remains, of course, whether regional associations would 
promote better business practices, or simply create opportunities to dilute 
existing principles of trade. A strong case would need to be made that the 
rules of any regional securities association that differ from NASD business 
conduct rules are necessary or desirable for the particular region or class of 
brokers or otherwise outweigh the benefits obtained through standardization 
of NASD compliance and enforcement practices. To the extent, however, 
that the NASD’s regional district personnel have developed unique 
practices or procedures, the codification of such practices or procedures in 
regional SRO rules may have some benefit. 
A second possible categorization of special purpose SROs might turn 
on the business model of their members. Today, for example, carrying 
brokers responsible for handling customer funds and securities and 
collecting margins for leveraged accounts are generally regulated under 
NYSE and DTCC or OCC rules. While, one could envision SROs that 
develop specialized rules for electronic trading systems, market makers and 
specialists, and other standard business models in the broker-dealer 
community, the formation of such SROs is unlikely for a number of 
reasons. First, the rapid consolidation of firms that perform similar 
activities may undermine the fundamental criterion that an SRO possess the 
necessary diversity of membership to avoid domination by a handful of 
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powerful interests. Second, to the extent that markets must be designed to 
facilitate the interaction of different business models (e.g., specialists and 
public brokers), allowing each to define the parameters of their business 
conduct without the participation of the other would create opportunities for 
overreaching or abuse. Third, the integration of different business models 
with individual firms could enhance the potential for redundant rules. 
The most compelling case for the creation of limited purpose SROs is 
product regulation. As discussed above, special SROs have been created 
for the regulation of various products that may be traded both by broker-
dealers and by other financial intermediaries. Thus, the MSRB regulates 
banks and broker-dealers trading municipal debt, and security futures 
exchanges jointly regulated by the SEC and CFTC regulate broker-dealers 
and futures commission merchants that trade security futures products. 
Within the securities markets, separate SROs exist that focus on the 
regulation of options markets (e.g., CBOE) and options transactions (e.g., 
OCC), equity markets and equity transactions (e.g., DTCC), and other 
products.131 
Products that might benefit from special purpose SROs are corporate 
debt and exchange-traded and over-the-counter derivatives. While exchan-
ges historically traded government and corporate bonds as well as listed 
stocks, the migration of debt trading into institutional over-the-counter 
markets has had both benefits and disadvantages. Debt securities had 
largely escaped national market system regulation until the late 1990s 
because such rules were predicated upon the ability to build upon existing 
quotation and execution mechanisms of stock exchanges. The Commission 
prodded the NASD to build display and execution mechanisms for listed 
and unlisted equity securities in the over-the-counter market, but these 
mechanisms could not be easily grafted to the even more decentralized 
world of debt. Only recently, with the increasing automation of the debt 
market, has the NASD undertaken to extend such mechanisms to debt 
securities. 
On the other hand, the extension of regulatory approaches devised for 
equity securities to debt securities without the opportunity for the industry 
to develop alternative approaches can have unfavorable consequences.132 
The obligation to obtain the best execution of a debt transaction reasonable 
under the circumstances poses particular difficulties in debt markets, where 
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dealer quotations are not centralized.133 Transaction reporting protocols for 
debt securities underwent several rounds of modification and remains 
subject to criticism because of the greater volatility of debt prices resulting 
from the relative illiquidity and size of debt transactions.134 As the 
retailization of corporate debt continues, however, the Commission and 
self-regulators are likely to face even greater pressure to adopt rules 
governing corporate debt transactions. As with the MSRB, a specialty 
regulator for corporate debt—or an SRO dedicated to drafting specific rules 
governing all debt transactions—might be the optimal approach. 
Exchange-traded options and derivatives also operate pursuant to 
unique rules driven by the nature of options markets that may merit a single 
derivatives market self-regulator. As discussed above, special trading rules 
have been developed by options exchanges to induce greater participation 
by market making and order routing intermediaries on options exchanges.135 
Portfolio margining systems for options and derivatives transactions in U.S. 
securities markets have not developed as quickly as in U.S. futures markets 
in part because of the need for multiple options and non-options SROs to 
amend their rules in concert.136 Options firms have also had difficulty in 
“regularly and rigorously” reviewing their order routing practices in part 
because of the lack of uniformity in current execution quality reporting 
practices by options exchanges.137 
Over-the-counter derivatives present an even more compelling case for 
a self-regulatory scheme because such products are subject to minimal 
regulation by federal financial regulators. The Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000 has exempted “swap agreements” among 
“eligible contract participants” from off-board trading restrictions on 
financial futures and most federal securities regulation (other than certain 
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antifraud rules for equity-based swaps).138 While such exemptions may be 
appropriate in light of the wide range of financial institutions that trade such 
products and their relative sophistication, there is no recognized public 
forum in which industry members may seek to self-regulate. Standard 
agreements developed by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association and voluntary disclosure efforts encouraged by the Federal 
Reserve Board and others to control counterparty credit exposure provide 
some mutual self-regulation,139 but only modest effort has been undertaken 
to develop business conduct standards or other forms of reciprocal self-
regulation despite frequently recited concerns about the leverage of hedge 
funds, institutional investors, and other swap counterparties and the lack of 
infrastructure in the swaps marketplace.140 
The advantage of a self-regulatory scheme over informal industry 
coordination is the antitrust immunity conferred by the SRO structure. As 
with the original arrangements that led to the creation of the NASD under 
the Maloney Act, banks and broker-dealers that act as swap intermediaries 
could agree to transact on more favorable terms with one another than with 
non-SRO members as a means of encouraging compliance with industry 
norms. Such arrangements could include the participation in black-box or 
other mechanisms that monitor direct and indirect counterparty credit 
exposure as a supplement to bilateral risk management measures. Swap 
intermediaries that failed to adhere to such standards would not be subject 
to civil or criminal enforcement, but rather the traditional SRO sanction: 
paying higher fees to lay off positions with member intermediaries. 
C. BETTER ENFORCEMENT TOOLS 
Congress and the Commission may also wish to consider whether 
concurrent public or private enforcement of SRO rules would improve the 
self-regulatory model, particularly if self-regulatory concepts are to be 
leveraged to international linkages. The conceptual core of SRO regulation 
is standard-setting. Delegating compliance and enforcement functions to 
SROs has some theoretical basis—to the extent that industry members have 
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a mutual or reciprocal interest in the regulation of their competitors—but 
has largely been viewed as a means of avoiding the direct financial and 
political costs to the SEC of policing the securities industry’s business 
conduct. At the same time, given the significant skepticism about the 
efficiency of private litigation, it is unlikely that private rights of action for 
infringement of SRO rules would be viewed as a favorable option. 
One approach would be to undertake concurrent public enforcement 
action against firms that willfully violate SRO rules, either through a 
pattern of misconduct or egregious violations. The unrestricted scope of 
Rule 10b-5 and varying standards of scienter makes it an undesirable tool 
for regulation of securities intermediaries, but a more focused Commission 
rule that targets abusive business conduct defined by a registered standard-
setter presents a more compelling case for Commission action. A new 
Commission rule to supplant Rule 10b-5 enforcement actions would also 
create a fresh opportunity to deter the implication of private rights of action. 
SROs may also wish to consider whether there are market-oriented 
approaches to enforcing SRO rules. Greater disclosure in confirmation 
statements regarding execution quality—such as presenting contem-
poraneous price quotations, realized spreads, or other information—would 
create a powerful disincentive to violate best execution rules, even if private 
enforcement action against questionable transactions is generally prohibited 
for conduct short of fraud. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The irony should not be lost that the Commission is considering 
whether to write exchanges out of the Exchange Act: It suggests that in 
harnessing the power of exchanges for the benefit of investors, we have 
extinguished their innate incentives to bring order to the securities markets. 
The concept of self-regulation, however, has permeated so many 
operational aspects of the securities industry that it would be very difficult 
to eliminate it entirely from the federal regulatory framework. Investors 
have benefited from the continuing dialogue between the Commission and 
self-regulatory bodies as listings have multiplied, securities grown more 
complex, and market structures evolved in various product areas. A 
product-oriented system of self-regulation, with consolidated NASD 
enforcement, might serve as a worthy heir to the legacy of self-regulatory 
exchanges. 
